recognized much more frequently than were changes in surface form.
In our view, investigating memory for sentences in the context of prose passages can be extended to investigating memory for sentences in the context of conversation, rich with added mean ings from nonverbal behaviors. Now, if emotion depicted in con versation occupies a superordinate position with respect to in dividual sentence meaning (as does the gist of a passage), we should expect to find that changes in �motional meaning would be recognized more frequently than changes in wording that re flect the emotional meaning of the conversation, and that emo tionally tinged elaborations are produced during recall.
Investigators report in the nonverbal communication literature that emotion can be recognized in facial expressions (e.g., Frijda, 1969) , gestures (e.g., Gitin, 1970) , posture (e.g., Rosenberg & Langer, !965), and tone of voice (e.g., Davitz, 1964; Kramer, 1963 ). Yet scant evidence can be found for confusions in memory for the content of verbal and nonverbal communication. Gei selman and his colleagues (Geiselman & Bel1ezza, !977; Gei selman & Crawley, 1983) have interpreted incidental memory for the voice of the speaker from an interactive perspective. They suggest that connotations implied by vocal tone elaborate the meaning of spoken sentences. In contrast, we were interested in incidental memory for what was said and how it might be affected by such nonverbal factors as vocal tone (how it was said). Ac cordingly, we videotaped three scenes, each from two different emotional perspectives. Only the nonverbal behaviors varied be tween the versions of each scene and conformed to the emotions we wished to portray.
In Experiment I, we examined confusions displayed in a forced-choice recognition task, following two types of orienting tasks that directed attention to nonverbal behaviors: a task that emphasized the surface characteristics of gestures and vocal tone and a task that encouraged interpretations of emotions. These tasks very roughly correspond to orienting tasks for verbal ma terial that call attention to its surface features or to its meaning (cf.Craik& Lockhart, 1972) .Comparedtosurface tasks,semantic tasks have more in common with the cognitive demands of recall and recognition and therefore produce better memory perfor mance (Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979) . In borrowing this distinction, we intended to examine the necessary conditions for encoding meaning from nonverbal behaviors in such a way that it might be confused in memory with the meaning of dia logue. Is it necessary to consciously or effortfully interpret tone of voice and gestures-the whine and wringing of hands, for example-or is it sufficient merely to notice them while extracting meaning from dialogue? The conscious interpretation of emotion might be necessary to establish a record in memory that could be easily accessed during recall or recognition. On the other hand, encoding the meaning of dialogue is typically an effortless task, and it produces memories that are often easily retrieved. Perhaps we are equally skilled in extracting emotional meaning from nonverbal behaviors without intending to think about their sig nifi cance.
In Experiment 1, then, subjects either attended to the surface characteristics of nonverbal behavior or interpreted the emotions they portrayed. Because Sachs (1967) found that confusions be tween semantically similar sentences increased with delay in testing, we wondered if confusions along an emotional dimension might also increase with time. So we varied the retention interval by testing immediately, or after one week. In printed recognition tests, 1 we presented target utterances along with distractors that were emotionally consistent or inconsistent with the videotaped version, or emotionally irrelevant. In addition, we assessed rec ognition of the surface form of utterances by including surface distractors. A few studies suggest that memory for surface form in conversation is unusually good (e.g., Keenan, MacWhinney, & Mayhew, 1977; Kintsch & Bates, 1977) compared to memory for the surface form of written or spoken discourse (e.g., Sachs, 1967}. A subsidiary aim, then, was to determine the possible influence of nonverbally portrayed emotion on recognition of surface form.
In Experiment 2, we employed cued-recall procedures in order to explore the relation between viewers' moods and their ten dencies to erroneously remember emotion in utterances. Recent investigaiions of mood and memory (e.g., Boggiano & Hertel, 1983; Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979) have indicated that err ors in memory perfor mance are qualitatively similar to the mood of the subject. Here, we were concerned with the possibility that the subjects' natural moods might either ameliorate or confuse the effects of actors' moods on memory for their utterances.
Experiment 1 Method
Materials. Each of three short scenes was videotaped twice, from two different emotional perspectives. The restaurant scene depicted a woman's reaction of disgust or interest in hearing her friend's tale of infidelity. In the classroom scene, a girl expressed joy or fear about going away to college to her friend across the aisle. And in the telephone scene, a woman expressed anger or distress in discovering that she had just been robbed. The two versions of each scene contained the same dialogue and differed only in the nonverbal behaviors of vocal tone, body posture, gestures, and facial expressions that the actors displayed.
In order to validate the two emotional perspectives, 12 pilot subjects saw one version of each scene or read written transcripts of the conver sation. Their task was to pick from a list of adjectives (Plutchik, 1980, p. 166) five that seemed to best characterize the primary actor. Adjectives that were selected four or more times for any scene served as the criterion for evaluating perceived emotion. Subjects who saw Version I of the res taurant scene (disgust) chose annoyed, disgusted, displeased, and irritaLed.
In contrast, the adjectives for those subjects who saw Version 2 (interest)
were amused, curious, fasr:inaLed. and interested. For the classroom scene, subjects who saw Version I Uoy) chose the adjectives delighted, elated. excited, happy. joyful, proud, and self-satisfied, whereas the adjectives anxious, confo.sed, fearful, insecure, and nervous were selected by those who viewed Version 2 (fear). Finally, for Version 2 of the telephone scene (anger) the adjectives angry. annoyed, disgusted, irritated, and upset were chosen, whereas for Version I (distress), subjects chose the adjectives anxious, depressed, distressed. and upset. Individual subjects who read the written transcript of each scene made selections quite similar to those just described. However, u a group, their selections did not reflect the consistency of the results from the videotaped versions. For example, choices for the transcript of the restaurant scene included displeased as frequently as curi ous (3 subjects each).
In a second pilot task, subjects used a 7-point scale from not at all to extremely to respond to questions about the emotional state of the primary actor in each scene (e.g., "How fearful did the student seem about going away to college?"). The medi an ratings by subjects who viewed the vid eotapes were consistent with the particular versions they had viewed (ie., close to not at all by those who saw the joy version, and close to extremely for those who saw the fear version). Median ratings by subjects who read the transcript were in the neutral range. This ordering of median ratings occurred for 10 of the 12 questions.
In Experiment I, the forced-choice test for each scene consisted of six items containing four alternatives. The first two items were filler items.
(Data for these items were not included in analyses.) The remaining four items contained the following alternatives: the target (the actual utterance that occurred in the scene), a surface distractor (an utterance in which the exact wording of the target was changed, but the meaning was pre served), an emotional distractor (an utterance in which the surface form of the target remained mostly intact but the meaning was changed slightly by incorporating words or phrases that express emotion), and a surface/ emotional distractor (an utterance in which the previous surface and emotional distractors were combined). We included the last category to prevent subjects from adq,ting a test strategy of eliminating the one alternative out of the previous three that was most dissimilar. Hereafter, we refer to these last two categories of alternatives as emotional distractors.
The type of emotional distractors varied across items for all of the subjects. Two items contained distractors that reflected the emotion por trayed in Version I of the scenes, and two items reflected Version 2 (see Table I for examples}. Thus, the recognition test presented two items with emotional distractors that were consistent with the version of the scene each subject had viewed and two items with emotional distractors that were inconsistent.11\vo forms of each test were constructed in order I think it wiU be a big change. It's so far away. My family won't be around.
I'm glad it's going to be a big change. It's very far away. I won't have my family around. I'm glad it will be a big change. It's very far away. My family won't be around. Fear distractor Surface/fear I'm afraid it's going to be a big change. It's too far away. I won't have my family around. I'm afraid it will be a big change. It's too far away. My family won't be around.
to vary the type of emotional distractor for each item. Across subjects, therefore, each target was judged in the context of both types of emotional distractors. The order of the alternatives within each item was randomly assigned and was identical for both forms. Item order conformed to ut terance order in the scripts.
Design. A mixed design factorially combined three between-subjects factors (or ienting task, retention interval, and version), with scene and type of emotional distractor (emotional alternatives that were either con sistent or inconsistent with the version viewed) as ... . 1thin�ubjects factors. In the surface task, the subjects recorded the frequencies of speci fic ges.. tures, whereas in the interpretation task the subjects rated discrepancies between vocal tone and posture in communicating attitude. The retention interval was either approximately 5 min or 1 week . Half of the subjects saw Version I of all three scenes ("disgust" for the restaurant scene, "joy" for the classroom scene, and "distress" for the telephone scene); the other half saw Version 2 ("interest," "fear," and "anger," respectively). The order of the scenes {telephone, restaurant, classroom; classroo m, telephone, restaurant; or restaurant, classroom, telephone) and the form of the rec ognition test were counterbalanced within conditions of orienting task, retention inten'al, and version.
Subjects. A total of 105 undergraduate students at Trinity University volunteered as subjects in order to receive credit in an i ntroductory psy chology course. Groups of 3-5 subjects were randomly assigned to each of the eight combinations of orienting task, retention interval, and version.
Three subjects failed to return for the second session; so, in order to control for this self-selection factor and to establish appr()Jlri ate coun terbalancing, the data from 6 subjects were randomly eliminated, with the constraint that no fewer than I 2 subjects remained per condition and equal numbers saw the scene$ in each order and took each form of the recognition test The data from 96 subjects were analyzed.
Procedure. When subjects arrived for t� first session of the experi ment, the experi menter told them that they had volunteered for a pilot study on the social psychology of conversation. Then, the subjects in the surface-processi ng condition were told that the purpose of the study was to insure that three videotaped scenes contained an adequate number of noticeable body movements and to estimate vocal pitch. Their task. was to focus on a specific body movement of the primary actor in each soene and to record it s frequency (bead nodding by the listener in the restaurant scene, hand movements by the student who got acce pted to college, and eye movements in the telephone scene). frequencie$ were recorded on paper, but subjects were required to keep their eyes on the videotape.
The experimenter encouraged them to listen to the conversation and mentioned that they would later rate their i nterest in each soene and write a short description of its topic.
Foliowing eacll soene, subjects rated the overall pitch of the primary actor's tone of voice from low (I) to high (7) and their interest in the'
scene from not at all inJerested (I) to very interested (7). Last, they wrote short descriptions of the scene's t()Jlic. The purpose of the interest-rating and describing tasks was to insure attention to the dialogue, in addition to the nonverbal behaviors.
The subjects who were required to interpret nonverbal behaviors were led to believe that the purpose of the pilot study was to investigate judg ments about vocal tone and body posture. Their first task was to judge whether the primary actor's tone of voice lit with her body posture in communicating her attitude. This judgment was made on a scale that ranged frum not discrepant (J) to discrepanJ (7). Then, a second taslc required that they choose five adjective$ that described the primary actor's attitude as expressed by vocal tone and body posture only. Both tasks were designed to instigate careful attention to the emotional meaning of nonverbal behaviors, in contraSt to the taskJI of rati ng pitch and counting movements. These tasks followed the showing of ea<:h scene and were, in tum, foliowed by the interest-rating and description tasks.
After all of the tasks were completed, the experimenter dismissed the subjects who were to be tested one week later and told them that they would judge additional scene$ when they returned. No mention of the memory test was made. The subjects who were tested in the first sessi on were required to return in one wee lc, but only to receive credit for their participation.' Immediately prior to testing, all of the subjects were told that an additional purpose of the experiment was to examine memory for the dialogue. All of the recognition tests (one for each scene, taken consecutively) were self-paced, and their order conformed to the order in which the scenes had bee n shown. Each test began with instructions to choose the alternatives that the subjects believed occurred in the vid eotape. Thsting procedures ·were identical for both retention intervals. Table 2 reports the mean proportion of choices for targets, surface-form distractors, and emotional distractors in both testing conditions and according to the nature of the emotional dis tractors (consistent and inconsistent). Due to the lack of inde pendence among these choices, the overall design was not sub mitted to analysis. However, it is quite clear that the proportion Although we had suspected that memory for the surface form of utterances might be influenced by the type of emotional dis tractor (better without the distraction provided by emotionally consistent distractors), this was not the case.
Results and Discussion

Experiment 2
Mood ef f ects in memory are often found wit h recall procedures but are rarely obtained in recognition (but see Leight & Ellis,
1981, for an exception). Therefore, we changed the testing pro cedure in Experiment 2 to cued recall in order to examine the rn addition to our interest in mood, we were somewhat con· cerned that when we provided emotional recognition alternatives in the previous experiment we encouraged the subjects to make emotional errors that they might not have made without the emot ional cues. Such cues were eliminated by our recall pro cedures.
The design of Experiment 2 also included a control condition in which subjects re ad transcripts of the scenes. The results of our pilot study indicated that subjects could infer emotiona\ in tent of the primary actors after reading transcripts of the scenes when they were asked to do so (although the nature of these inferences varied a great deal). This is not surprising, given that we wrote scenes that would lend themselves to interpretations consistent with the emotions we wished to vary. However, our interest in Experiment 2 was in whether these interpretations might occur spontaneously (unrequested) and af f ect recall in the same manner as emotion inferred from videotaped behaviors.
Method
AI the besinning of the sessions, the experimenter distributed copies of a mood clteclclist. This cltecldist rontained one of two randomly ordered lists of 2 I emot i onal words, each followed by a 7-point rating scale an chored by not aJ all and extremely. The list was compiled by selecting the three most frequent descriptors used by pilot sub j ects for each vciSion of each sce ne and adding three additional words that were less frequently chosen (annoyed. disgustec(. displeased, irritated. amused, curious. inter ested, excited. happy, joyful, confused.fea rful. insecure. anxious. depressed. distre1.·sed, angry, upset, confident. nervous, a.nd tired). Subjects were in structed to indicate their current moods under the cover that the psy cbology department was interested in the mood of subjects who participate in experiments. Then, the conversations from the previous experiment were presented in one of three conditions: Version 1 of the three scenes, Versioo 2 of the three scenes , or transcripts of the three scenes. Eighteen subj ects were randomly assisned to each condition. Three ordeiS of the scenes were counterbalanced within these acquisitioo conditions. We in structed subjects in all conditions to read or to attend to the scenes; questions would follow. These brief instructions were us.;d in order to make the i nstructions consistent across all versioos, including the tran scripts.
Following a 2-min interval, forms for the recall task were distributed. Four questions about the conversation in each scene were listed on one page, in the order corresponding to conversational order. (Examples are presented in the Appendix.) The instructions emphasized memory t or utterances, rather than interptetations, but exact wording was not required The subjects answered the quest ions for each scene in turn, with the order of the scenes preserved.
During debriefing, we solid ted remarks about our attempts to deceive them about the purpose of the mood ratings, and we requested written self-reports on the judged source of emotion (verbal or nonverbal) present in the scenes.
Results and Discussion
Emotional e"ors. Two judges, blind to acquisition conditions, independently categorized each response to each question as , it was not reliable. Finally, the ef f ect was not obtained tor Version 2 of the restaurant scene (interest). In summary, all of the subjects who saw the videotapes produced more emotional errors that were consistent with the versions they had viewed than errors corresponding to the other versions. Moreover, for two types of emotional errors (disgust and fear) the videotapes produced reliably more errors than did the transcripts.4
Recall accuracy. Our judges scored responses to each question for the number of propositions or idea units correctly recalled.
("I think it's going to be a big change" contains three propositions:
{a) it will be a change, (b) the change is big, and (c) I think {that a and b are true].) They disagreed about 8% of the responses �d resolved their differences. These numbers were then summed across all items in each scene and converted into a proportion of the total number of propositions in the scene. Table 5 reports the mean proportion of propositions recal.led in each acquisition condition and scene. When these proportion s were analyzed ac cording to acqvisition condition, scene, and version, we found
• Also, note that subjects who read transcripts made emotional errors that did not rel i ably d iff er according to the type of emotion. that they differed only with respect to scene, F "" 35.08. The classroom scene was most accurately recalled, and it was also the scene that produced the most numerous emotional errors. (Similarly, the telephone scene produced the least accuracy, M = .37, and the fewest emotional errors.) Thus, based on analyses of average performance, emotional confusions di d not depend on poor memory for actual dialogue. In addition, bivariate cor relations between the proportion of proposit ions recalled and the n � mbcr o� consistent emotional errors were not reliable. A neg atlve relaoon between the number of emotional errors and the number of propositions correctly recalled by each subject would have suggested that subjects filled in the gaps in their memories for utterances with descriptions of nonverbally portrayed emo tion. This was not the case.
Mood and emotional e"ors. Next, we examined the associ ation of moods with corresp onding emotional errors in recall. In separate multiple regression analyses of errors co rresponding to eac� version of the scenes (e.g., errors reflecting disgust, in terest, JOY, and fear), we added ratings on the mood scales after a contrast code representing the transcript condition versus the relevant videotape condition. ln predicting fearful errors, for ex ample, the contrast code represented transcript versus Version 2. The mood scales we used iu each analysis corresponded to the adjectives chosen by the pilot subjects for that version. For example, amused, curious, and interest£d were used to predict the numbet of emotional errors corresponding to the interest version of the restaurant scene.
Four such analyses were performed, one for each type of emo tional error for the restaurant and classro om scenes. ln only one case did the addition of the mood predictors reliably increase R2 over the variability due to viewing the videotape: When sub jects reported initial moods that were consistent wi th the fear version of the classroom scene, they tended to make more fearful errors in remembering that scene than could be predicted from knowledge that they had see n the fearful videotape, .F(3, 30) = 3.48, MS ... = .182. This .19 increase in R 2 contributed to an R 2 of .45 for the full equation, F(4, 29) "" 6.25, MS..,. = .507.
Therefore, we found limited relations among moods reported at the start of the sess ions and emotional erro rs in recall .
s There are two possible reasons why these relations were so limited First, in contrast to the designs of most research on mood and memory, we used reports of natural moods and thereby limited the r anse of moods experienced by our subjects. In additional analyses of the mood data, we entered the contrast codes that represented acquisition conditions into equations that included the appropri ate mood predictors, in order to discover if moods accounted for the differences we had attributed to non verbally communicated emotion. This use of mood covariates did not alter the previously described results.
General Discussion ln summary, we emphasize that we have found evidence for confusions in melllory for what was said with how it was said, under a variety of processing and testing conditions, and that these confusions were independent of the viewers' moods. The effect of nonverbally communicated emotion on memory for utterances was demonstrated for most of our malerials. However, we cautiously note that the effect seems to depend on how con vincingly the emotions are portrc1yed and how well the viewers can identify with the situations. Also, the effects we di d obtain were modest; in Experiment I, for example, recognition of the surface form of utterances was quite good, even after a week's delay. We have organized our discussion of the m<ijor outcomes of these experiments in relation to (a) conditions for processing emotion from nonverbal behavior, (b) the effects of misleading information on memory, and (c) models of mood and memory.
Our results suggest that directed interpretations of the emo tional meaning of vocal tones and gestures are unnecessary in the production of later confusions in memory. Emotional errors occu.rred in a variety of conditions for processing nonverbal be hav iors. In Experiment 1, the instructions that called attention to surface characteristics of nonverbal behaviors (number of ges tures and vocal pitch) produced similar numbers of consistent emotional errors as did those that demanded emotional inter pretations as part of the task. In Experiment 2, specific instruc tions regarding nonverbal behaviors were not provided. An in teresting possibility, then, is that interpretations of emotion au tomatically result from percept ions of nonverbal behavior. This poSii ibility i s consistent with the proposed biological basis for interpreting nonverbal behavior and findings that even very young children accurately identify emotion in facial expressi ons (Izard, 1971 (Izard, , 1978 Plutchilc, 1980) . However, this automaticity account i s not demanded by our findings. It is quite possible that our subjects went beyond the instructions for the surface task in Experiment I and the processi ng task in Experiment 2 to con sciously construct meaning from nonverbal expressions. Clearly, fu rther research to address thi, issue of automaticity must include a measure of conscious interpretation.
The effect s obtained in these experiments are similar to those obtAined in studies of reconstructive memory as a function of misleading information (e.g., Hertel, 1982; Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978; Spiro, 1980) . However, the present experiments differ from these studies in our fai lure to find an increase over time in errors that reOect misleading information (nonverbally communicated emotion). The previous studies provided mis leading information temporally separate fr om the to-be-remems Possible interactions betwee n subject mood and version were also tested and found to be nonsigni6canL bered event, but our misleading information was temporally in tegrated with utterances. Therefore, changes in discrimination based on temporal cues could at least partially account for the increased error rate in their studies, while fa iling to play a role in the present experiments.
An issue that is common among investigations of misleading information concerns the nature of its influence when memory for the original event is tested. Do errors reflecting misleading information (or nonverbally communicated emotion in this case) reflect integrative memory processes or do they merely show that the subject (a) has difficulty remembering the event, (b) remem bers the postevent bias (or nonverbal behavior), and (c) uses the latter to fill in the gaps during recall? In such a case as the latter, as we discussed earlier, we might observe a negative relation be tween errors and accuracy; in Experiment 2, there was none. Another way to examine the possibility that subjects were con fa bulating is to ask them if they know that their emotional errors emanate from nonverbal expressions of meaning.
At the end of the session in Experiment 2, we asked subjects to indicate the nature of the emotion in each scene and whether it had bee n communicated verbally, nonverbally, or in both ways. Only 3 subjects attributed emotion to the nonverbal behaviors alone.6 Next, after telling them that emotions were communicated nonverbally, we asked subjects to judge whether these portrayals had affected their accuracy in recalling the utterances. They were allowed to review their protocols in making these judgments, and they indicated, to one degree or another, that they might have been influenced. However, no reliable correlations obtained between judged effects of emotion and the number of emotionally consistent errors. These self-reports, then, provide some addi tional support for the notion that confusions resulted from in tegrative memory processes, rather than from conscious attempts to fill in the gaps in memory for dialogue.
Finally, we emphasize that models of mood and memory must address not only the influence of emotions experienced by the self, but the effects of emotions portrayed by others, as well. First, Experiment 2 provided evidence that moods reported by our subjects were correlated with recall errors that reflected fe ar or insecurity. Isen et al. ( 1978) and Bower ( 1981) have proposed models for understanding how the mood of the subject is related to qualitative aspects of memory performance, and our mood results are consistent with these explanations. However, by fa r the larger effects of emotions on memory performance in these studies were produced by the nonverbal behaviors of the actors, rather than by the moods of the audience. To account for these effects, models of mood and memory must provide for the ac tivation of emotion in memory by events unrelated to the self. Within Bower's ( 1981) model, for example, interpretations of emotions that have bee n nonverbally communicated would see m to occur via the links fr om evoking appraisals and exp ressive behaviors to the emotion node. Expressive behaviors (the way we display emotions) are, of course, what we refer to as nonverbal behaviors. Bower described evoking appraisals as "standard evocative situations which when appraised lead to [an emotion]" (p. 135). Our scenes, fo r example, represent situations that typ ically evoke one set of emotions or another, as indicated by pilot ratings. Perhaps through a process of identification with the ac tors, these situations evoke emotions, even though the viewers are not directly experiencing them. The classroom scene, particularly the version representing fe ar, consistently produced emotional errors most fre quently and, of course, going away to college is something that almost all of our subjects have expe rienced.
' Five out of 36 subjects for the restaurant scene and 18 out of 36 for the classroom scene attributed emotions to the verbal utterances alone.
